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Using the recently released EU KLEMS Database (March 2007) and other statistics, we 
examined whether Japan experienced similar problem as the major EU economies with regard to the 
introduction of ICT to market services. The major results obtained through our analysis are follows: 
1.  It is not the gap in TFP growth but differences in factor input growth that underlie the large 
difference in the economic growth performance of France, the UK and Italy on the one hand 
and Japan on the other in the period after 1995. The four major EU economies (Germany, 
France, the UK and Italy) and Japan experienced a slowdown in TFP growth of a similar 
magnitude after 1995. The US was exceptional in accomplishing an acceleration in TFP growth. 
2.  TFP growth in the electrical machinery, post and communication sector was still highest in 
Japan among the six economies after 1995. However, the problem for Japan is that, like in other 
countries, the share of this sector in the economy overall is not very large. The largest declines 
in TFP growth in Japan occurred in distribution services (retail, wholesale and transportation) 
and in the rest of the manufacturing sector (i.e., excluding electrical machinery). The labor 
input shares of these two sectors were very large (23.4% and 16.8% respectively). The US and 
the major EU economies except Italy recorded high TFP growth in these two sectors. 
3.  In manufacturing sectors, productivity levels in Japan were on par with those in the US, 
Germany and France. However, they were very low in comparison with the three countries both 
in market services and other goods-producing industries. It therefore seems that there is large 
room for improvement in Japan’s productivity in market services and other goods-production 
services through the adoption of already existing technologies and better resource allocation. 
4.  The US and the UK experienced a very rapid increase in ICT capital service inputs after 1995. 
In contrast with this, in Japan, the contribution of ICT capital service input growth declined in 
all sectors after 1995. Across the six countries, we can observe a positive correlation between 
ICT capital service input growth and TFP growth. This fact supports the conjecture that Japan’s 
sluggish growth in ICT capital service inputs is at least partly responsible for the slowdown in 
Japan’s TFP growth after 1995. 
5.  According to several recent studies, it seems that in order to fully realize the direct and indirect 
efficiency-improving effects of ICT capital, the simultaneous accumulation of intangible assets, 
such as human capital and organizational capital, is indispensable. Investment activity in 
intangibles is less active in Japan than in the US and the UK, although there are many 
high-skilled workers in Japan. The relatively low level of intangible investment may be a good 
candidate to explain why the accumulation of ICT capital and TFP growth stalled in Japan. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, Japan’s economic growth 
stalled: real GDP growth in the period 1995-2004 did not exceed 1.0%, which is considerably slower 
than the 3.3% growth registered in 1973-1995 (based on data from the EU KLEMS Database, March 
2007) and the lowest among the six major developed economies (the US, Japan, Germany, France, 
the UK and Italy).   
A frequently heard argument in Europe and the US is that the core countries of the EU, such 
as Germany and France, have been falling behind the US in terms of increasing productivity. Inklaar 
et al. (2006), for example, found that although the level of labor productivity in Germany, France 
and the Netherlands was almost same as that in the US, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in 
these countries since the mid-1990s has been much slower than in the US, especially in market 
services. Similarly, van Ark et al. (2006) report that TFP growth in industries using information and 
telecommunication technology (ICT-using industries) in the core EU countries since 1995 has been 
much slower than in the US. Meanwhile, Stiroh (2002a) and Triplett and Bosworth (2002) report that 
TFP growth in ICT-using industries in the US, such as communication, finance and commerce, has 
accelerated substantially since 1995 and this acceleration represents the main engine of productivity 
growth in the US economy.   
The slowdown of Japan’s economic growth and the above mentioned studies comparing TFP 
growth in the EU and the US raise the question whether Japan has a similar problem as the major EU 
economies with regard to the introduction of ICT to market services. Yet, despite the importance of 
this issue, there have been few studies which compare TFP growth and the impact of the ICT 
revolution in the major EU economies, Japan and the US at the industry level – probably because of 
the lack of appropriate data for a broad and rigorous international comparison.   
In order to analyze this issue, researchers of the Japan Industrial Productivity Database Project, 
including the authors, have joined the EU KLEMS consortium and supplied original data on Japan 
for the EU KLEMS database. The first public-release version of the EU KLEMS database is 
available online at the EU KLEMS website, <http://www.euklems.net/>. In this paper, using this 
database, we compare productivity growth and the accumulation of ICT capital by industry in Japan, 
the major EU economies, and the US. We also use the results of the labor productivity comparison 
project at the Japan Center of Economic Research. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview of 
the pattern of economic growth and productivity improvement in Japan, the major EU economies, 
and the US. We also compare the absolute labor productivity levels of these countries by industry. In 
Section 3, we analyze the role of ICT investment on economic growth in these countries. It is 
frequently argued that in order to fully realize the direct and indirect efficiency-improving effects of 
ICT capital, the simultaneous accumulation of intangible assets, such as human capital and  2




2. Overview of Economic Growth and Productivity Improvement in the Major EU Economies, 
Japan and the US 
We first compare the results of growth accounting for Japan, the major EU economies 
(Germany, France, the UK and Italy), and the US. Figure 1 shows the growth accounting results for 
the market sector of these countries for the periods of 1980-95 and 1995-2004. The figure shows that 
Japan experienced a severe downturn during the latter period and, of the countries considered here, 
registered the highest annual rate of growth (3.6%) in 1980-95, but the lowest rate (0.7%) in 
1995-2004. Germany experienced a mild slowdown in economic growth (from 1.9% to 1.1%).
1 The 
other four countries registered acceleration in economic growth after 1995. The average growth rate 
for the four countries rose from 2.3% in 1980-95 to 2.6% in 1995-2004.   
 
INSERT Figure 1 
 
There is a stark difference in the causes underlying the acceleration in growth in France, the 
UK and Italy on the one hand and the US on the other. In the three EU countries, the acceleration in 
economic growth was mainly achieved through labor input growth. As Figure 2 shows, the increase 
in labor input growth in France and Italy did not take the form of improvements in labor quality but 
of increases in total hours worked. In contrast, in the case of the UK, the quality of labor input 
improved substantially. Until 1995, these three countries suffered high unemployment rates, 
especially among the less-educated young, but succeeded in creating jobs for these unemployed. The 
average of the standardized unemployment rate of the three countries declined from 11.3% in 1995 
to 7.4% in 2004. On the other hand, the standardized unemployment rate in Japan increased from 
3.1% to 4.7% during the same period (OECD 2006). In contrast with the three EU countries just 
mentioned, the main cause of the growth acceleration in the US was an increase in TFP growth (from 
0.7% in 1980-95 to 1.6% in 1995-2004). 
 
INSERT Figure 2 
 
Turning to TFP growth in Japan and the four major EU economies, a similar slowdown can be 
observed. Comparing the two periods, Japan’s average TFP growth rate dropped by 0.8 percent 
points, from 1.2% in 1980-95 to 0.4% in 1995-2004. In the four major EU economies, the TFP 
                                                  
1 The EU KLEMS data on Germany for years before Germany’s unification include East Germany.  3
growth rate also declined by 0.8 percent points, from 1.0% in 1980-95 to 0.2% in 1995-2004. Thus, 
among the six major developed economies, the US is exceptional in the acceleration in TFP growth 
it experienced. 
Looking at the factors contributing to the slowdown in growth in the market sector of Japan’s 
economy, the most important is the decline in the contribution of capital input growth. Of the 2.9 
percentage-point decline in the growth rate of Japan’s market sector from the earlier to the latter 
period, 42% was accounted for by the deceleration in capital accumulation. In contrast, in all of the 
other five countries, the contribution of capital input growth increased (Figure 3). In particular the 
US and the UK experienced an acceleration in capital accumulation. As Figure 3 shows, this capital 
deepening in the two countries was caused by the rapid accumulation of ICT capital. 
 
INSERT Figure 3 
 
To sum up the above analysis, it is not the gap in TFP growth but differences in factor input 
growth that caused the large difference in the economic growth performance of France, the UK and 
Italy on the one hand and Japan on the other in the period after 1995. The four major EU economies 
(Germany, France, the UK and Italy) and Japan experienced a slowdown in TFP growth of a similar 
magnitude after 1995. Only the US accomplished an exceptional acceleration in TFP growth.   
Figure 4 compares industry level TFP growth in the six countries before and after 1995. TFP 
growth in the electrical machinery, post and communication sector was still highest in Japan among 
the six economies after 1995. However, the problem for Japan is that, like in other countries, the 
share of this sector in the economy overall is not very large. The average share of labor input (hours 
worked) in this sector in Japan’s total labor input in 1995-2004 was 4.1%. In the US, this share was 
3.3%. The largest declines in TFP growth in Japan occurred in distribution services (retail, wholesale 
and transportation) and in the rest of the manufacturing sector (i.e., excluding electrical machinery). 
The labor input shares of these two sectors were 23.4% and 16.8% respectively. The US and the 
major EU economies except Italy recorded high TFP growth in these two sectors. Compared with 
Germany, France and the UK, Japan’s TFP growth in 1995-2004 was low in other goods- producing 
industries (construction, mining, agriculture, fishery and forestry), but relatively high in finance and 
business services. Except in France, TFP growth in personal and social services stalled in all the 
countries examined here.   
 
INSERT Figure 4 
 
If a country’s productivity is at the world top level, then in order to accomplish further 
productivity improvement, the country needs to innovate (Acemoglu et al. 2006) and to adjust her  4
economic structures to novel technologies. On the other hand, if a country’s productivity level lags 
behind the world frontier, then the adoption of already existing technologies and improvements in 
her resource allocation are probably more important. Inklaar et al. (2006) found that labor 
productivity levels in market services in continental Europe were on par with the US in 1997, but 
since then productivity growth in Europe has been much weaker, suggesting that the continental 
European countries need to do more to innovate and adjust economic structures to novel 
technologies. This observation raises the question: Is Japan in a similar situation as the continental 
European countries?   
Unfortunately, the EU KLEMS Database (March 2007 version) does not include data that 
allow a comparison of productivity levels across countries. In this paper, we therefore use the results 
of a comparison of labor productivity conducted by the Japan Economic Foundation (JEF) and the 
Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER) (JEF-JCER 2007).
2  The study compares 27 industries 
covering the whole economy for the period 1980-2003 (1980-2002 in the case of Japan). The 
JEF-JCER comparison of labor productivity for Japan, Germany, France, the UK and the US is 
mainly based on purchasing power parity (PPP) data for 1997 from the EU KLEMS Project, real 
value added and man-hour input data from the EU KLEMS 60-Industry Database, the Input-Output 
Tables of the OECD STAN Database, and the Asian International Input-Output Table 2000 of the 
Institute of Developing Economies.
3 Differences of labor input quality across countries and over 
time are not taken account of in the JEF-JCER labor productivity comparison. Basically the study 
compares the real value added per man-hour after adjustments for absolute price differences.   
 
INSERT Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 
 
Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the results of the JEF-JCER study for 2002. In the case of the 
comparisons between the US and European countries, the results are similar to those of Inklaar et al. 
(2006). Productivity levels in Germany and France were very close to those in the US both in market 
services and manufacturing, while productivity levels in the UK were lower than in the two 
continental European countries. In manufacturing sectors, productivity levels in Japan were on par 
with those in the US, Germany and France (Figure 5). However, they were very low in comparison 
with the three countries both in market services and other goods-producing industries. It therefore 
seems that there is large room for improvement in Japan’s productivity in market services and other 
                                                  
2 We would like to thank Ms. Reiko Suzuki of the JCER for helping us to gain access to the 
JEF-JCER data and providing us with various valuable comments. 
3 The JEF-JCER study also compared the labor productivity of China and the US and of Korea and 
the US by industry. In addition to the above-mentioned data sources, the intra-Asian comparisons are 
based on the PPP data of the International Comparison of Productivity Among Asian Countries 
(ICPA) Project conducted by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).  5
goods-production services through the adoption of already existing technologies and better resource 
allocation. 
 
3. The Role of ICT Investment in the Economic Growth of the Major EU Economies, Japan 
and the US   
There are several studies which suggest that a main factor underlying the acceleration in 
economic growth in the US after the mid-1990s was an increase in ICT investment (Stiroh 2002a, 
Triplett et al. 2002, van Ark et al. 2003). Given these results, other developed countries have started 
to follow the US example and are promoting ICT investment. In this study, using data from the EU 
KLEMS Database (March 2007), we examine the role of ICT investment in Japan and the major EU 
economies. 
The EU KLEMS Database defines ICT investment as investment in computing equipment, 
communication equipment, and software. Figure 9 shows the growth paths of ICT capital service 
inputs in the economy overall for the US, the four major EU economies, and Japan. ICT capital 
service inputs are calculated based on the three types of ICT capital stock used in the EU KLEMS 
definition. 
 
INSERT Figure 9 
 
From the viewpoint of ICT capital accumulation at the macro level, it seems that the six 
countries can be divided into three pairs of countries. The front runners are the US and the UK, 
which experienced a very rapid increase in ICT capital service inputs after 1995. Their capital 
service input indices in 2004 are as much as four times as high as their 1995 levels. The next pair 
consists of France and Germany. Their capital service inputs in 2004 were about 2.8 times greater 
than in 1995, meaning that capital service inputs in these two countries grew at 12% per annum from 
1995 to 2004. The last pair consists of Japan and Italy. ICT capital service inputs in 2004 in both 
countries were less than twice as high as their 1995 levels. Before 1995, the average growth rate of 
ICT capital service inputs in Japan was second highest, trailing only behind the UK among the six 
countries. However, investments in computers in the 1980s mainly consisted of main-frame 
computers, and Japan’s low investment in capital service inputs during the latter period, likely to be 
at least partly the result of the long-term economic stagnation during the 1990s, suggests that firms 
were unable to keep up with the rapid trend of computer downsizing and the mass introduction of 
office PCs in the 1990s.   
When we look at movements in ICT capital service inputs by industry, we find almost the 
same trends as in the economy overall. The growth rate in ICT capital service inputs in Japan was 
relatively low, particularly in service sectors such as distribution services and personal service  6
industries, as shown in Figures 10 and 11. 
 
INSERT Figures 10 and 11 
 
The impact of the accumulation of ICT capital on economic growth can be classified into two 
types of effects. The first is the direct effect of capital accumulation. This can be measured by using 
investment costs, since it can be assumed that cost minimizing investors will equalize the marginal 
productivity of ICT capital services with their marginal costs. The second type is the indirect or 
external effects. An increase in ICT capital may enhance the efficiency of firms’ production 
processes or engender a more efficient pattern in the division of labor in each industry and hence 
accelerate TFP growth. 
Table 1 shows the direct contribution of ICT capital to economic growth by industry. In the 
US and the UK, the contribution of ICT capital increased in almost all sectors after 1995. In France, 
the contribution of ICT capital service input growth increased in all sectors except personal and 
social services. In Germany, the contribution of ICT capital service input growth increased in all 
sectors except two (distribution service and personal and social services). In contrast, in Japan and 
Italy, there are many sectors where the contribution of ICT service input growth decreased after 1995. 
In Japan, the contribution of ICT capital service input growth declined in all sectors after 1995, 
while in Italy, it fell in all sectors except two (finance and business services and personal and social 
services). 
 
INSERT Table 1 
 
We now turn to the indirect effect of ICT capital service input on economic growth based on 
the fact that the introduction of ICT equipment raises the efficiency of business activities at the firm- 
and industry-level and stimulates TFP growth. Across the six countries, we can observe a positive 
correlation between ICT capital service input growth and TFP growth (Figure 12). For example, the 
US enjoyed a high TFP growth rate coupled with a high growth rate in ICT capital service inputs, 
while, on the other hand, in Japan and Italy, a low growth rate in ICT capital service inputs coexisted 
with a low or negative TFP growth rate. We should note that based on Figure 12 alone we cannot say 
anything about the direction of causality between ICT capital service inputs and TFP growth. In 
order to determine the direction of causality, we need to conduct formal econometric tests such as 
those by Stiroh (2002b) or Miyagawa, Ito, and Harada (2004). However, the preliminary findings in 
Figures 3 and 4 support the conjecture that ICT capital service input growth promotes economic 
efficiency. 
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INSERT Figure 12 
 
 
4. Intangible Assets as Complements to ICT Capital 
According to several recent studies, it seems that in order to fully realize the direct and 
indirect efficiency-improving effects of ICT capital, the simultaneous accumulation of intangible 
assets, such as human capital and organizational capital, is indispensable (van Ark 2004, Minetaki 
2004, Bloom et al. 2006, and Kanamori and Motohashi 2006). We examine this issue in this section.   
Van Ark (2004) emphasized that intangible assets played a complimentary role to ICT capital 
in affecting productivity growth. In his study, he classified intangible assets that were 
complementary to ICT capital into five types: human capital, knowledge capital, organizational 
capital, marketing of new products, and social capital (see Table 2).   
With regard to these different types of intangible assets, the EU KLEMS Database provides 
data on the accumulation of human capital. Human capital accumulation is usually measured by the 
share of skilled labor in the economy. In the EU KLEMS Database, high-skilled labor is defined as 
workers who graduated from university. If human capital enhances the direct effect of ICT capital, 
the return to ICT capital will tend to be high in countries with higher human capital and such 
countries will have a more active accumulation of ICT capital. Figure 13 shows the share of high- 
skilled labor input in total labor input in the US, the four major EU economies, and Japan. The figure 
illustrates that the share of high-skilled labor inputs in all countries is on an upward trend, and shares 
do not seem to converge to a certain level. The US has maintained the highest high-skilled labor 
share among the six countries for the past 24 years, while Japan has maintained the second highest 
share. Judging from this figure and our finding that ICT capital service input growth in Japan has 
been stagnated since 1995, it seems that formal university-level education is not a key intangible 
asset that enhances the accumulation of ICT capital. 
 
INSERT Table 2 and Figure 13 
 
Next, let us compare the accumulation of broader categories of intangible assets in developed 
economies. Our comparison is based on preceding research, including our own (Fukao et al. 2007) 
which estimated various types of intangible assets in developed economies using the methodology 
developed by Corrado et al. (2005, 2006). 
Intangible assets in Corrado et al.’s approach consist of three major categories: computerized 
information, innovative property, and economic competencies. Computerized information consists of 
software, databases, etc. Innovative property includes scientific and nonscientific R&D, where the 
latter refers to, for example, mineral exploitation, copyright and license costs, and other product  8
development, design, and research expenses. Economic competencies include brand equity, 
firm-specific human capital, and organizational structure.   
Fukao et al. (2007) measured intangible investment in Japan using the above classification.
4 
The results of Fukao et al. (2007), Corrado et al. (2006) on the US, and Marrano et al. (2006) on the 
UK are summarized in Table 3. Intangible investment in Japan was about 50 trillion yen on average 
from 1995 to 2002. The amount is equivalent to 9.6% of Japan’s GDP, a ratio that is smaller than that 
in the US or the UK. 
 
INSERT Table 3 
  
Moreover, comparing the relative levels of intangible and tangible investment in Japan and the 
US, other significant differences emerge. For example, Corrado et al. (2006) found that in the United 
States, intangible investment was 1.2 times the level of tangible investment. However, according to 
Fukao et al. (2007), the ratio of intangible to tangible investment in Japan is only 0.5. Figure 14 
shows the ratio of intangible to tangible investment in Japan and the United States. The figure 
illustrates that the ratio of intangible to tangible investment in the United States is on an upward 
trend. The intangible investment series estimated following Corrado et al.’s (2005, 2006) approach is 
one of the most comprehensive measures of the accumulation of intangible assets. According to this 
measure, investment activity in intangibles is less active in Japan than in the US and the UK, 
although there are many high-skilled workers in Japan.
5 The relatively low level of intangible 
investment may be a good candidate to explain why the accumulation of ICT capital and TFP growth 
stalled in Japan. 
 
INSERT Figure 14 
 
5. Conclusions 
Using the recently released EU KLEMS Database (March 2007) and other statistics, we 
examined whether Japan experienced similar problem as the major EU economies with regard to the 
introduction of ICT to market services. The major results obtained through our analysis are follows: 
1.  It is not the gap in TFP growth but differences in factor input growth that underlie the large 
difference in the economic growth performance of France, the UK and Italy on the one hand 
                                                  
4 In this paper, using new data on design and legal services, we revised the estimates of investment 
in innovative property and economic competencies by Fukao, et al. (2007). 
5 We should note that both ICT capital and intangible assets in Corrado et al.’s (2005, 2006) 
definition include computer software. However, Japan’s sluggishness in intangible asset 
accumulation cannot be explained by sluggishness in computer software investment, since compared 
with the US and the UK, Japan’s investments in innovative property and economic competencies 
were small.    9
and Japan on the other in the period after 1995. The four major EU economies (Germany, 
France, the UK and Italy) and Japan experienced a slowdown in TFP growth of a similar 
magnitude after 1995. The US was exceptional in accomplishing an acceleration in TFP growth. 
2.  TFP growth in the electrical machinery, post and communication sector was still highest in 
Japan among the six economies after 1995. However, the problem for Japan is that, like in other 
countries, the share of this sector in the economy overall is not very large. The largest declines 
in TFP growth in Japan occurred in distribution services (retail, wholesale and transportation) 
and in the rest of the manufacturing sector (i.e., excluding electrical machinery). The labor 
input shares of these two sectors were very large (23.4% and 16.8% respectively). The US and 
the major EU economies except Italy recorded high TFP growth in these two sectors. 
3.  In manufacturing sectors, productivity levels in Japan were on par with those in the US, 
Germany and France. However, they were very low in comparison with the three countries both 
in market services and other goods-producing industries. It therefore seems that there is large 
room for improvement in Japan’s productivity in market services and other goods-production 
services through the adoption of already existing technologies and better resource allocation. 
4.  The US and the UK experienced a very rapid increase in ICT capital service inputs after 1995. 
In contrast with this, in Japan, the contribution of ICT capital service input growth declined in 
all sectors after 1995. Across the six countries, we can observe a positive correlation between 
ICT capital service input growth and TFP growth. This fact supports the conjecture that Japan’s 
sluggish growth in ICT capital service inputs is at least partly responsible for the slowdown in 
Japan’s TFP growth after 1995. 
5.  According to several recent studies, it seems that in order to fully realize the direct and indirect 
efficiency-improving effects of ICT capital, the simultaneous accumulation of intangible assets, 
such as human capital and organizational capital, is indispensable. Investment activity in 
intangibles is less active in Japan than in the US and the UK, although there are many 
high-skilled workers in Japan. The relatively low level of intangible investment may be a good 
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Figure 4. TFP Growth in the Market Sector: by Sector and by Country

















































































































































































































































Figure 5. Labor Productivity: Japan-US Comparison
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Figure 6. Labor Productivity: Germany-US Comparison
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Figure 7. Labor Productivity: France-US Comparison
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Figure 8. Labor Productivity: UK-US Comparison
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March 2007.Table 1. Direct  Contributions of ICT Capital Service Input Growth to Economic Growth
1995-2004
Japan US France Germany Italy UK Japan US France Germany Italy UK
Market sector total 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.2 1.0
Electrical machinery,
post and communication 1.2 1.0 0.4 2.3 0.8 1.3 1.0 1.5 0.8 2.7 0.2 2.7
Manufacturing,
excluding electrical
machinery 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.5
Other goods-producing
industries 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
Distribution services
0.2 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 1.0 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.8
Finance and business
services 1.6 1.0 0.7 2.2 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.8 0.7 1.8
Personal and social
services 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.5
Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2007.





















































































Growth rate of ICT Capital Service InputTable 2. Classification in Knowledge Capital
(A) ICT capital








　（C1) Research and development and patents
　(C2) Lincenses, brands, and copyrights




　(D3) Structure in database and its use
　(D4) Remuneration of innovative ideas
(E) Marketing of new products ('customer capital')
(F) Social capital





















































Computerized information 10,630 154 19.8
     Software 9,556 151 19.9
 Custom software 6,626
 Packaged software 841
 In-house software 2,088 12.4
     Databases       1,075 3
Innovative property 26,796 425 37.6
 Science and engineering R&D 13,522 184 12.4
 Mineral exploration 19 18 0.4
 Copyright and license costs 4,579 75 2.4
 Other product development, design,
and research expenses 8,676 149 22.4
Economic competencies 13,356 505 58.8
 Brand equity 4,982 140 11.1
    Firm-specifc resouecs 8,374 365 47.7
 Firm-specific human capital 1,426 28.5
 Organizational structure 6,948 19.2
Total 50,783 1085 116.2
Total intangible investment /GDP (%) 9.6 11.7 10.9
Intangible investment/tangible investment 0.5 1.2
Sources: Fukao et al. (2007), Corrado et al. (2006) and Marran and Haskel (2006).
7.5Source: Corrado et al. (2006) Source: Fukao et al. (2007)
Figure 14. Business Investment (percent of business output)
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